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Charles Fahy
Charles Fahy received a Bachelor of Laws degree from Georgetown in
1914. He attended school in the evenings while working in the day as legal
secretary to Joseph J. Darlington, then a leader of the local bar. His
secretarial skills must have helped him take law school notes, for a half-
century later, as a sitting judge, he was still taking notes of oral arguments in
shorthand. At the Law School-it had not yet assumed the more pretentious
title of Law Center-he was active on the first staff of the Georgetown Law
Journal, the Debating Society, the Morris Club, the members of which
practiced brief writing and oral advocacy skills, and the Law School Sodality,
an organization that actively combined the Catholic religion and the law.
Upon graduation his peers noted in the class yearbook, Ye Domesday Booke,
that he was "Young in limbs, in judgment old." The description under his
graduation picture was quite prescient:
He isn't very large-neither was Napoleon-nor is he very noisy,
but the brain does not talk. He is familiar with the legal atmos-
phere, likes it, and if hard work and good sense are due to win,
Charlie will some day earn the deserved plaudits of a larger and
more appreciative assemblage than ours.
The chronology of Charles Fahy's achievements has been often told:
practicing lawyer, naval aviator, first General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board, Solicitor General, Legal Advisor of the Department of
State, diplomat, and judge. His personal imprint lies upon many of the legal
developments of the twentieth century. The expanded role of government in
economic affairs since the New Deal era is the result, in part, of his guidance
of the NLRB at its perilous inception in 1935 and his large role in
constructing and presenting the critical Jones & Laughlin case.' That case not
only preserved the NLRB and the Wagner Act, but also marked the turning
point of the Supreme Court's attitude toward government regulation of the
economy.
Charles Fahy was also a central figure in the development of the principle
that a person may be convicted of a crime only through the exercise of a
process that shows respect for the dignity of the person and is limited by a
1. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Actually, five cases were presented to the
Supreme Court in the 1936 term to test the constitutional validity of the Wagner Act. They are usually
referred to collectively as Jones & Laughlin. The other four cases are NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301
U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); and Washington, Virginia & Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142
(1937). Charles Fahy did not actually make the oral argument in Jones v. Laughlin, as he did in Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing Co. and Associated Press. J. Warren Madden, Chairman of the NLRB, and Stanley
Reed, then the Solicitor General, successfully argued for the constitutionality of the Wagner Act in Jones &
Laughlin. Nevertheless, as General Counsel of the NLRB, Charles Fahy certainly played a major role in
mapping out the litigation strategy that culminated in the arguments before the Supreme Court on
February 10 and 11, 1937. Mr. Chief Justice Earl Warren characterized the management of the Jones &
Laughlin litigation-the selection of cases, the making of a record, the framing of arguments-as "one of
the most important jobs of lawyering in this century." Address of retired Chief Justice Earl Warren at
dedication of Fahy Reading Area, Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 10, 1971), reprinted in Fall
1971 REs IPSA LOQUITUR 7, at 8.
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structure of procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution. For example,
he was prominent in the evolution of the protection against self-incrimination:
As defense counsel he participated in the Wan case in 1924;2 he was Solicitor
General when McNabb3 was argued; and his dissent in Goldsmith4, and
majority opinion in Killough5 pointed the way for the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in Escobedo6 and Miranda.7
Charles Fahy certainly played a significant role in the eradication of racial
segregation in our society. After the Second World War, he chaired the
committee that was appointed by President Truman to eliminate racial
segregation in the Armed Forces, and he accomplished that difficult task
through persuasion and reason. As a circuit judge, he wrote the dissent that
later became the unanimous Supreme Court opinion in the Thompson
Restaurant case,8 thus ending segregation in public facilities in the District of
Columbia before Brown v. Board of Education9 was decided.
In the international sphere, his influence was also felt. He served as legal
advisor to the American Military Government in post-war Germany and gave
counsel informally at Nuremberg. He was also present, as an advisor to the
American delegation, at the birth of the United Nations in San Francisco in
1945. More recently, he was a member of the panel that held in a per curiam
opinion that the transfer of the Canal Zone to Panamanian control and
possession was within the treaty-making power of the President and the
Senate. 10
Charles Fahy's contacts with Georgetown did not end with his receipt of
an LL.B. in 1914. Throughout his public career he remained available to the
Law School as moot court judge and sodality breakfast speaker, in addition to
participating in many informal capacities. He served as a member of the
Board of the University's Institute of Law, Human Rights, and Social Values,
and at his death he was on the Advisory Board for Continuing Legal
2. Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1, 16 (1924) (confession obtained after five days of relentless
interrogation and denial of medical attention to suspect suffering from colitis held involuntary as matter of
law).
3. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1943) (admissions held inadmissible because
obtained through process that undermines integrity of criminal justice system; suspects not taken to
judicial officer for commitment hearing, as required by statute, before interrogation).
4. Goldsmith v. United States, 277 F.2d 335, 340-41 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (reaffirmation, following judicial
warning and advice from counsel, of concededly inadmissible confession held not inadmissible as fruit of
original confession).
5. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241,244 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) (reaffirmation ofinadmissible
confession made without advice of counsel held inadmissible fruit of original confession).
6. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (once criminal investigation focuses upon particular
suspect in police custody, sixth amendment requires that suspect be given opportunity to consult with his
lawyer and be warned of absolute right to remain silent in face of questioning).
7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (once criminal suspect has been significantly deprived
of freedom of action, no statement elicited from him may be offered in evidence by prosecution unless use
of procedural safeguards to secure fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be demonstrat-
ed). See Warren, supra note 1, at 9 (noting Judge Fahy's identification in Goldsmith and Killough of the
relevant constitutional principles addressed in Escobedo and Miranda).
8. Thompson v. District of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 100, 110 (1953)
(upholding validity of long-unenforced antidiscrimination statute in District of Columbia).
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1064 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). Appellants
had argued that pursuant to the property clause, the exclusive constitutional means of disposing of United
States property was congressional legislation. 580 F.2d at 1056.
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Education at the Law Center. His last public appearance was at Georgetown's
Gaston Hall on May 29th of this year, and the last written piece by this
remarkable man was published in the Georgetown Law Journal shortly after
his death.I
That last written work, though short, summarizes much. It is a commen-
tary on a burning issue of the day, the abortion issue. Of course it was not a
polemic, but a reasoned response about the role of the Supreme Court in the
handling of that issue. As always, he was able to deal with an important,
emotional issue within the constraints of a constitutional legal system.
Georgetown has often honored Charles Fahy. He received from the
University an honorary doctorate of laws, the John Carroll Medal, and on
May 29th last, on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of his graduation from
law school, the President's Medal. Perhaps the most fitting honor, however,
was bestowed after Judge Fahy's law clerks and friends established the
Charles Fahy Book Collection at the Law Center, to which the Judge
contributed much of his own legal library. When the current Law Center
building was opened in 1971, the University dedicated the law library's
central reading area to this distinguished graduate. The man and the occasion
were perhaps best summarized in the opening lines of Judge Fahy's remarks
on that day:
A reading area in a library reflects what has been. What is to be
depends largely upon what has been. An adult was a child; a tree
was a seed. Yet an adult is not a child, nor a tree a seed, for though
there is continuity there is great change. So it will be with those
who use this library, with its treasures to be mined and fashioned or
discarded as those who study here may think best.
I hope they will think of the law, both as it has been and will be,
as a civilization of its own, enhancing the whole of our civiliza-
tion.12
Yet, this does not say it all. To complete the picture of Charles Fahy's
relations with the Law Center one would need to include his many visits to
the law library and his personal chats with the students there. Of particular
note was that remarkable day when Judge Fahy, with little ceremony,
gathered about him the students in the library and rededicated the Fahy
Reading Area to the students then studying the law, and the generations yet
to come. Then too there was the day in late spring of his eighty-seventh year,
when Charles Fahy had the time to spend an afternoon with a Law Center
seminar, discussing the Supreme Court. Those Georgetown students who
were there knew that they were in the presence of a man who had done much,
yet, as one of them reported:
[H]e did not speak down to us as a towering figure possessed of all
the wisdom and power in the universe. Instead, he spoke in such
modest, even quiet tones that one truly felt that he was receiving
11. Fahy, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Response to Professor Perry, 67 GEo. L.J. 1205 (1979).
12. Response of Judge Charles Fahy at dedication of Fahy Reading Area, Georgetown University Law
Center (Sept. 10, 1971), reprinted in Fall 1971 REs IPSA LOQUITUR 10, at 10.
1979]
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more pleasure from meeting with several law students than we as a
class received from having the privilege of meeting him.13
It is the footnote to that story that is truly the measure of the greatness of
Charles Fahy:
[T]hat luncheon was not the end of this experience. Several days
later I received a letter from Judge Fahy, in which he stated that he
had not been satisfied with the answer to a question I had asked of
him at the luncheon. He then proceeded to explain how he had
directed the Labor Act cases of 1936-37, thus saving the New Deal
from judicial butchering.
Besides providing me with a glimpse of historical "background",
the letter struck me as an incredible gesture of thoughtfulness on
the part of a man who could legitimately claim to have had several
careers of historical impact. 14
To those who have had the good fortune of knowing Judge Fahy well, this
story is typical of the man.
Perhaps the greatest tie between Georgetown and Charles Fahy has been
the recognition that he exemplified the essence of the legal education that
Georgetown seeks to convey. Yes, he was an accomplished craftsman and
technician of the law. But he was more. As Judge Bazelon writes in these
pages, Judge Fahy did not believe that religion was to be relegated to sabbath
mornings. Although he believed in the separation of church and state, he saw
no contradiction in a man of government bringing to his responsibilities the
moral values of his religion. Even more, he saw the law as a force for the
moral good of humanity. In an age in which realism became rampant, before
faltering on the shoals of what appeared to be its ineluctable results in the
1930's and 1940's, Charles Fahy believed deeply that there is a greater moral
value against which the law must be judged, a moral value that imbues our
constitutional system and yet transcends it. Mr Chief Justice Earl Warren
perhaps stated it best:
Judge Fahy's vision of the role of law is not that of a technician
adjusting and balancing competing political, economic and social
interests. He does not, to put it differently, regard the law as
ethically neutral, or the search for truth as foredoomed. His vision,
rather, is essentially that of a moralist. He believes that there is
such a thing as moral good and moral evil; that [in the political
order they are manifested as social justice] and social injustice; and
that in a perfect political order. . . the law would be an instrument
of rooting out the one and securing the other. He recognizes, of
course, that we do not live in a perfect order, and, moreover, that
the power of a judge is rightly cabined by institutional restrictions.
Still, within those restrictions he is moved by his conception [of]
justice as a controlling reality, and not simply as the label that one
13. Letter to Editor from Stuart H. Newberger '79, Georgetown Law Weekly, Oct. 8, 1979 at 9, col. 3.
14. Id.
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places on the outcome of a decision in order to conform to society's
expectations.15
The last word justly belongs to Judge Fahy. At the dedication of the Fahy
Reading Area he stated his credo, which says so much of what he has meant
to his Alma Mater:
A judge, a lawyer, anyone of a particular occupation, is more than
his occupation signifies. In his larger self he must live, and in living
must think, beyond his speciality. In suggesting now a particular
approach I realize [there] are many other directions in which
movement should be advocated. A choice may be made, however,
of what one deems most important, without disparaging the
thoughtful choice of others. I would therefore identify our single
most important need to be consciously to orient [sic] "within the
limits of [our] power," to paraphrase Cardozo, the use of freedom
and the fulfillment of our responsibilities toward the norms of our
Judeo-Christian heritage.
There are two concepts of freedom. One is the freedom the law
allows-the blessings of liberty our Founders envisaged as the fruit
of their plan of government. The other is the freedom of the spirit,
rooted in the moral law-freedom from an abuse of the freedom
the law allows. To the extent that these two freedoms merge into
one, and only to that extent, is there true freedom. So it seems to
me. This is my liberalism.16
SHERMAN L. COHN*
15. Warren, supra note 1, at 9.
16. Fahy, supra note 12, at 11.
*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.S.F.S. 1954, J.D. 1957, LL.M. 1960,
Georgetown University. Professor Cohn was a law clerk for Judge Fahy in the 1957-58 term.
